The legal challenges of the Arctic Sea Routes vis-à-vis the current geopolitical dynamics!

PC: Sara Fusco

At the beginning of this week (March 3–4, 2026), I had the pleasure of giving a speech at the Arctic Circle Rome Forum – Polar Dialogue held in the vibrant city of Rome. With around 500 scholars, diplomats, lawyers, and policymakers in attendance, the conference served as an excellent platform for exchanging ideas and debating the complex future facing the Arctic region. My talk, titled “The Legal Challenges of Arctic Sea Routes Responding to Current Geopolitical Tensions,” was structured around three main points. First, I provided factual background on the opening of Arctic Sea routes. Second, I discussed the current regulatory landscape and highlighted existing governance gaps. Finally, I addressed how increasing great-power involvement contributes to growing geopolitical tensions in the region.

I began with a simple observation: the Arctic is changing faster than most people realize. For centuries, thick sea ice kept ships away from the top of the world. Today, however, climate change is transforming the region. As ice retreats, routes that once existed only on maps are gradually becoming navigable. In particular, I focused on three corridors: the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the potential future Transpolar Sea Route. What makes these routes so significant is the distance. Sailing through the Arctic can shorten journeys between Europe and Asia by up to forty percent. This means less time at sea, lower fuel consumption, and potentially fewer emissions per voyage. Shipping companies have taken notice. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route has been steadily increasing since 2010, particularly for oil, gas, and mineral exports, and volumes continue to grow each year.

However, I reminded the audience that the Arctic remains one of the most difficult places on Earth to navigate. Ships face drifting ice, sudden storms, poor visibility, and extreme cold. Infrastructure is limited: there are few deep-water ports, limited repair facilities, weak communication systems, and sparse search-and-rescue coverage. Many vessels still depend on icebreakers to escort them through dangerous waters. Even as technology advances—through developments such as autonomous vessels or nuclear-powered ships—the Arctic remains a high-risk maritime environment. Yet the central focus of my presentation was not the ice or the ships, but the law.

One of the most complex questions in Arctic governance concerns the legal status of these sea routes. Some coastal states—particularly Russia and Canada—argue that parts of these routes constitute historic internal waters. Their position is partly grounded in historic usage and in provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Other states see the issue differently. They argue that these waterways function as international straits where ships should enjoy transit passage rights. While the disagreement may appear technical, it raises a fundamental question: are these routes national corridors under coastal state control, or international straits where freedom of navigation should prevail? Although this debate has existed for decades without a clear resolution, another important issue concerns the implementation of Article 234 of UNCLOS, which addresses “ice-covered areas.” This provision allows coastal states to adopt laws to prevent pollution from ships operating in icy waters where navigation is particularly hazardous. For many years, Article 234 provided the legal basis for stricter regulations in Arctic waters. However, climate change is now challenging the very premise of this rule. If ice no longer covers these waters for most of the year, can the same extraordinary regulatory powers still be justified? Critics argue that some of the requirements imposed along the Northern Sea Route—such as mandatory pilotage, advance notifications, and transit permissions—may extend beyond environmental protection and instead restrict navigation, potentially undermining the original intent of Article 234.

Maritime law concerning the safety of ship operations and environmental protection adds another layer to the discussion. The International Maritime Organization adopted the Polar Code to improve safety and environmental protection in Arctic waters. The code includes restrictions on heavy fuel oil and aims to reduce pollution risks. Yet even these rules have limitations. Black carbon emissions from Arctic shipping have increased significantly in recent years, and when this soot settles on snow and ice, it accelerates melting. At the same time, the Polar Code does not impose a comprehensive ban on grey-water discharge—wastewater from sinks, showers, and ship kitchens—leaving what many consider an important regulatory gap.

As I continued, it became clear that legal questions cannot be separated from geopolitics. The Arctic is increasingly emerging as a strategic space. For Russia, the region is central to its long-term economic and security strategy. Energy exports from Arctic LNG and oil projects depend heavily on maritime transport, and the Northern Sea Route as a transportation corridor is heavily controlled by Russia, often undermining the actual intent of UNCLOS article 234. The region is also home to a significant portion of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet. The United States tends to focus on freedom of navigation and on preventing excessive national control. Concerns that Arctic routes could become “nationalized” have pushed the region higher on NATO’s strategic agenda—particularly after Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. Meanwhile, China has entered the conversation, describing itself as a “near-Arctic state” and promoting the concept of a Polar Silk Road that would integrate Arctic shipping routes into global trade networks.